Thursday, April 21

Siva Vaidhyanathan on Why Copyright Matters Now

Copyright as Cudgel

By SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN

Let's pretend that a journal has just published your harshly negative review of a book in your field. In this review, you quote short passages from the book, confident that the long-accepted concept of "fair use" enables you to make even unwelcome use of copyrighted material for purposes of criticism.

But a week or so after the electronic version of the review appears on the publication's Web site, the editors inform you that it violates the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and that they are removing it. You are welcome to respond. You are free to argue that the use of the copyrighted quotes falls under fair use. But the publication is under no obligation to accept your defense. So you publish the review on your own Web page. But you soon discover that all of the major Web search engines have removed your site from their indexes.

That couldn't happen, you say? Welcome to the new millennium.

When Congress brought copyright law into the digital era, in 1998, some in academe were initially heartened by what they saw as compromises that, they hoped, would protect fair use for digital materials. Unfortunately, they were wrong. Recent actions by Congress and the federal courts -- and many more all-too-common acts of cowardice by publishers, colleges, developers of search engines, and other concerned parties -- have demonstrated that fair use, while not quite dead, is dying. And everyone who reads, writes, sings, does research, or teaches should be up in arms. The real question is why so few people are complaining.

Consider the recent case of the Church of Scientology International and the search engine Google. The wealthy church used the threat of a well-financed lawsuit -- and the 1998 act's provision that a service provider will not be liable for infringement if it moves with "dispatch" to delete offending material -- to persuade Google to block links to several sites that included criticism of Scientology. "Had we not removed these URL's, we would be subject to a claim for copyright infringement, regardless of its merits," Google said.

Back in the 20th century, if someone had accused you of copyright infringement, you enjoyed that quaint and now seemingly archaic guarantee of due process. Today, due process is a lot harder to pursue, and the burden of proof increasingly is on those accused of copyright infringement. For the copyright act, in essence, makes the owner of every Internet service provider, content host, and search engine an untrained copyright cop. The default action is censorship.

The conflict between the Church of Scientology and Google is one of many such cases. In July 1999, shortly before Talk magazine made its debut, the writers John Aboud and Michael Colton posted online a parody of the magazine, which -- until it folded -- was produced by a partnership between Hearst Magazines and Miramax Films. Miramax lawyers sent a cease-and-desist letter to Earthlink, the Internet company that owned the server on which the parody sat. Earthlink immediately shut the parody down, although it restored the site after Talk's editor, Tina Brown, appealed to let it stand. Lawyers for both Miramax and the Church of Scientology cited the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (often known by its abbreviation, DMCA) as the basis of their claim.

Besides prompting such censorship, the act has another major provision, which upends more than 200 years of copyright law that has, until now, served democracy well: the principle that what copyright law does not specifically protect remains available to all to use, for whatever purpose the user sees fit. The DMCA bars the circumvention of electronic access controls that protect online works, a provision that seems to block the use of even those portions of works that might be in the public domain.

How direct the assault on academic freedom could become was demonstrated in spring 2001, when the music industry tried to prevent a computer scientist, Princeton University's Edward W. Felten, from presenting a scholarly paper at a conference. The Recording Industry Association of America argued that the paper dealt with encryption algorithms that it hoped to use to protect digital content, and so violated the copyright law. The association backed down, but the Felten case is merely the best known of several efforts that online-content industries have made to prevent researchers from discussing certain technologies and algorithms.

All of that is the reason I view the Digital Millennium Copyright Act as reckless, poorly thought out, and with gravely censorious consequences. Yet, back in 1998, when Congress passed the law, there was little public outcry -- or interest, for that matter. The news coverage tended to treat the act as a harmless extension of copyright to the new digital world. Most often, those who raised concerns were dismissed by advocates of copyright protection as radicals who were against copyright in general.

Since 1998, the DMCA has revealed itself to be a failure. It has not been effective at preventing piracy in cyberspace, yet it has managed to stifle harmless and even beneficial uses of material for research and teaching.

Various groups -- software producers, artists, writers, librarians, media activists -- have protested. But, with a few notable exceptions -- most significantly the Digital Future Coalition, an alliance that includes law professors, library groups, and scholarly associations -- we academics have been painfully slow to argue against abuses in and of copyright law.

When the DMCA was being considered, the Digital Future Coalition put up an admirable defense of the principles of access and fair use for teaching, research, and criticism. But the commercial forces allied against it were too formidable. In the absence of widespread public outcry, Congress could only rely on what the most powerful interested parties told it: that if some copyright protection is good, then more must be better. Had there been some grassroots activism by teachers, writers, and researchers, Congress might have realized that it was considering reckless legislation.

At the 2001 meeting of the American Studies Association, fewer than a dozen people attended a session that I organized on how the regulation of intellectual property threatens intellectual freedom. And those sessions have been few and far between at most academic meetings. If most of you and your colleagues have even heard of problems with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, chances are you assume that other people will take care of them. Won't they?

Academics have more to lose in the copyright wars than most people do. We are not only the source of much of the "content" in the world. We are -- through our teaching and research -- among the major conduits and consumers of the content that others provide. We have a vested interest in keeping information flowing as cheaply, widely, and quickly as possible. We need a rich, diverse, affordable, and accessible information ecosystem to do our jobs.

So why have academics been caught napping? I have several hypotheses. They have to do with recent academic practice and culture, and its relation to our broader society.

Perhaps we have too blithely assumed that Congress and the American people actually value teaching and research and would not pass laws that impede either. We take our privileged positions in society for granted, and don't work to explain the importance of what we do. That is at the root of our discomfort when the public and legislators tell us that our scholarship is too arcane, our costs too high, and our workload too light.

Perhaps we have been too busy tilting at the windmills of the culture wars and the science wars to realize that the common interests of all academics are threatened. Internecine strife is so much more immediate. Perhaps, when and if some of us have realized that copyright matters, we have asked only, What's in it for me? Say "copyright" to many academics, and do they think primarily about protecting their own rights (even to a lot of what is really little more than worthless online content) -- instead of the wider world of scholarship?

More broadly, a mood has come to prevail not only in the academy -- particularly among administrators and trustees -- but also among legislators that has strengthened the thrust of copyright revision. Together, trends in scholarship, copyright law, and mood have combined to generate a set of assumptions about academic work that are weighted toward the exploitation of professors and the protection of a university's "property," and against sharing or distributing knowledge. The rising importance of privately sponsored research on campus and efforts by universities to capitalize on faculty research, distance education, and other opportunities are changing the nature of universities. While they are still the largest content-consuming institutions around, they have been thinking and acting like content providers -- and have missed the radical implications of changed copyright law.

As a result, course packets that used to be easy to assemble and affordable to students are now a hassle and a big expense. Professors are abandoning them in favor of prefabricated published readers or less-convenient library reserves. Getting permission to quote from a song or to include an old photograph in a scholarly publication is getting to be prohibitively expensive. Some professional journals are demanding that academic authors assign all rights in all media in perpetuity to them, then gouging subscribers and libraries for the right to read materials that academics weren't compensated for in the first place. Online journals are replacing paper volumes, allowing publishers to extort all sorts of user restrictions from libraries. And those are just the micro-horror stories, the short-term costs of current trends.

In a larger sense, while academics have slept, the content industries have systematically stifled flows of essential information, created artificial scarcity, and made certain areas of basic research potentially illegal.

Had we made a unified public stand against the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998, which extended the term of copyright protection by 20 years, we might have been better able to alter the terms of discussion, if not smooth out some of the more odious portions of the laws. Had we been able to persuade humanities scholars to step back from all the "problematizing" and "theorizing" that fills so many seminar rooms and journals and, instead, organize around clear themes and concerns, we could have joined scientists in their decade-long effort to keep information flowing by protesting ever-more-costly journals. And had administrators and lobbyists been less concerned about ways to capitalize on the false promise of online, for-profit education and more concerned with the actual future of education, we might have been able to unite in voicing opposition to copyright policies that threaten us all. Despite fashionable cynicism about our political system, Congressional representatives still read and care about constituent mail. And they still care about their local education institutions.

Fortunately, scholars and teachers, even when silent, will benefit from the hard work of public-interest groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, digitalconsumer.org, and publicknowledge.org. These activist organizations are struggling to accurately define the "public interest" in copyright and debating how best to articulate the issues to a diverse public. But without widespread, grass-roots support, these groups will face the same frustration that the Digital Future Coalition experienced in 1998 -- a remarkably powerful and well-financed campaign from the entertainment industry. They need us as an ally.

Public-interest copyright activists are an ideologically diverse group. Many of us are classically liberal, civically republican, and philosophically pragmatic. We focus on restoring the balanced, humane principles that used to guide American copyright. We frame our rhetoric in terms of individual freedom, a modest level of state intervention, and a flexible, adaptable regulatory system. Others come from the perspective of religious freedom and conservative values. They want parents and teachers to have the right and ability to edit digital material they deem offensive, even if the DMCA prevents the use of the technologies required to alter the work.

Other equally active critics of recent trends in copyright take a Marxist perspective. They warn of the coming postindustrial infotainment-industrial complex and the ways it has enlisted the state in efforts to make commodities of all information and culture. Still others espouse a form of information anarchy. According to them, if we empower every user, limit the power of large corporations to regulate the flow of information, and democratize information generally, we can achieve a state of absolute liberty in which we all can both create and consume material.

All the critics lament the erosion of the democratic safeguards that made American copyright such a brilliant and effective system and that helped fill our libraries with books. Copyright can censor. It is a prohibition on what we may reproduce, quote, perform, and distribute. Over the past 200 years, however, through both statutes and the common law, the copyright system developed four safeguards that mitigated the potentially censorious power of its prohibitions:

* The principle of fair use -- in essence, a legal defense against an accusation of copyright infringement. If you are accused of infringing, you can make an argument that your use of the protected works is "fair" because of some combination of these factors: The nature of the original work makes it important that it be publicly discussed; the nature of your use of it is important because of teaching, research, or commentary; you do not use very much of the original work; your use does not significantly affect the market for the original work. In the public discourse about fair use, it has served as a term representing a collection of uses that consumers could consider "fair," like recording television shows for later viewing, making audiocassette tapes or MP3 mixes from compact disks, and limited copying for private, noncommercial sharing.

* The principle that after the "first sale" of a copyrighted item, the buyer can do whatever he or she wants with the item, except publicly perform the work or distribute unauthorized copies for sale. The first-sale doctrine is what makes lending libraries possible.

* The concept that copyright protects the specific expression of ideas, but not the ideas themselves. This is the least understood but perhaps most important tenet of copyright: You can't copyright a fact or an idea. Because you can't, anyone may repeat your idea, whether to criticize it or build on it. Journalism, along with many other forms of common expression, depends on the principle.

* The promise that copyright will last -- as the Constitution demands -- for only "limited times," thus constantly replenishing the public domain. The public domain allows for low-cost scholarship, research, and revision of formerly copyrighted works. The reason that bookstores are filled with high-quality yet affordable scholarly editions of Mark Twain's The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is that they are in the public domain. The reason there is no annotated scholarly edition of Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man is that it is not.

In other words, copyright, when well balanced, encourages the production and distribution of the raw material of democracy. It is supposed to be an economic incentive for the next producer, not a guarantee for the established one. But after more than 200 years of legal evolution and technological revolution, copyright no longer offers strong democratic safeguards. It is out of balance. Each of the four safeguards is under attack by the copyright cartel.

We need to restore them. Some of us, therefore, are generating friend-of-the-court briefs for the pending Supreme Court hearing on the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, in the case Eldred v. Ashcroft. We are fighting for the First Amendment right of a hacker magazine, 2600 (and for the right of everyone), to describe certain illegal algorithms and create hyperlinks to other pages that describe or offer those algorithms. And we are playing defense in the halls of the Capitol against pending legislation that would create a new and dangerous property right in databases of facts, and even more odious legislation that would require all producers of electronic hardware and software to include anticopying devices in their products. On the positive side, we are supporting Rep. Rick Boucher, a Virginia Democrat, who is considering introducing legislation that would temper the more censorious aspects of the DMCA.

One way to move toward a definition of the "public interest" in copyright is to examine its historical roots and the various concerns that interested parties have had with the evolving system over the past 400 years.

At its birth in England, copyright was an instrument of censorship. In 1557, Mary Tudor, the Roman Catholic queen, capped off a 120-year monarchal struggle to censor printing presses by issuing a charter to the Stationers' Company, a guild of printers. Only members of the company could legally produce books, which had been licensed by the crown.

In contrast, the American copyright system, in place since 1790, has reflected republican values. It grants a limited, temporary monopoly to a specific publisher. But just as important, the framers and later jurists concluded that creativity depends on the use, criticism, supplementation, and consideration of previous works. Therefore, they argued, authors should enjoy a monopoly just long enough to provide an incentive to create more, but the work should live afterward in the "public domain," as common property of the reading public.

James Madison, who introduced the copyright-and-patent clause to the Constitution, did not engage in absolutist "property talk" about copyright. He argued in terms of "progress," "learning," and other such classic republican virtues as literacy and an informed citizenry. When President George Washington declared his support for the Copyright Act of 1790, he proclaimed that it would be a step toward "teaching the people themselves to know, and to value their own rights; to discern and provide against invasions of them; to distinguish between oppression and the necessary exercise of lawful authority." Thomas Jefferson -- author, architect, slave owner, landowner -- had no misgivings about protecting private property. Yet he expressed some serious doubts about the wisdom of copyright, based on his suspicion of concentrations of power and artificial monopolies.

I believe that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act represents a failure of that trust in the copyright system to cope with the democratic potential of changing communication technologies.

The danger is clear. It's time to find a way to discuss copyright issues in the public sphere that doesn't leave substantive deliberation to a select group of trained experts. The public has as deep a stake in the outcomes of the copyright debate as any lobbyist or plaintiff. At one point, Napster had 77 million registered users, more than twice the number of America Online users. And there are few Americans who have not wondered about the intrusive power of that video "mattress tag," the FBI warning at the start of every rental videotape. But the common rhetoric about copyright obscures much of what is at stake.

We make a grave mistake when we choose to engage in discussions of copyright in terms of "property." Copyright is not about "property" as commonly understood. It is a specific state-granted monopoly issued for particular policy reasons. While, technically, it describes real property as well, it also describes a more fundamental public good that precedes specific policy choices the state may make about the regulation and dispensation of property. But we can't win an argument as long as those who hold inordinate interest in copyright maximization can cry "theft" at any mention of fair use or users' rights. You can't argue for theft.

Two rhetorical strategies have emerged. Most prominent is "commons talk." A growing number of activists and law professors are pushing for an appreciation of the "information commons." Sparked by a brilliant 1997 article by the Duke University law professor James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?," this movement toward preservation and expansion of an information commons resembles the environmental movement 40 years ago. With good luck and hard work, activists hope to build a similar level of public concern and awareness about how information operates in society, and the need for it to be commonly owned and shared. For an important statement on the information commons, see David Bollier's Silent Theft: The Private Plunder of Our Common Wealth (Routledge, 2002).

The second rhetorical strategy involves focusing on users of copyrighted material -- everyone who reads, writes, watches, photographs, listens, or sings. This is a more pragmatic approach, intended to warn people that the harmless acts they have taken for granted for years, like making a mixed tape or CD for a party, or "time shifting" television programs and skipping commercials, are threatened by recent changes in law and technology. The organization digitalconsumer.org is promoting "The Consumer Technology Bill of Rights," which makes private, noncommercial uses positive rights instead of weak defenses to accusations of infringement.

Within academe, we can use those strategies to make clear to our students, our peers, our Congressional representatives, and the public that copyright is a bargain, a good deal for everyone. As both content producers and users, we are in a good position to outline the complexity and benefits of such a deal. And we are in a good position to highlight the abuses that copyright holders have engaged in since 1998.

We must be blunt about the current system's threats to free speech, intellectual freedom, and the free flow of information. We must be careful not to be trapped in nihilistic rhetoric about the "end of copyright." Copyright need not end if we can rehabilitate and rehumanize it. Our jobs depend on it.

Siva Vaidhyanathan, an assistant professor of information studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, will become an assistant professor of culture and communication at New York University this fall. He is the author of Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity (New York University Press, 2001).

Wednesday, April 20

so much for the catholic church moving forward...

The New York Times > Opinion > Op-Ed Columnist: Smoke Gets in Our News:

"The white smoke yesterday signaled that the Vatican thinks what it needs to bring it into modernity is the oldest pope since the 18th century: Joseph Ratzinger, a 78-year-old hidebound archconservative who ran the office that used to be called the Inquisition and who once belonged to Hitler Youth. For American Catholics - especially women and Democratic pro-choice Catholic pols - the cafeteria is officially closed. After all, Cardinal Ratzinger, nicknamed 'God's Rottweiler' and 'the Enforcer,' helped deny Communion rights to John Kerry and other Catholic politicians in the 2004 election."

Tuesday, April 19

Justice Scalia - the "Activist Judge"

Not since the 1960's, when federal judges in the South were threatened by cross burnings and firebombs, have judges been so besieged. Senator John Cornyn, Republican of Texas, set off a furor when he said judges could be inviting physical attacks with controversial decisions. And last week the House majority leader, Tom DeLay, called for an investigation of the federal judges in the Terri Schiavo case, saying ominously: "We set up the courts. We can unset the courts."

Conservatives claim that they are rising up against "activist judges," who decide cases based on their personal beliefs rather than the law. They frequently point to Justice Antonin Scalia as a model of honest, "strict constructionist" judging. And Justice Scalia has eagerly embraced the hero's role. Last month, after the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty for those under 18, he lashed out at his colleagues for using the idea of a "living Constitution" that evolves over time to hand down political decisions - something he says he would never do.

The idea that liberal judges are advocates and partisans while judges like Justice Scalia are not is being touted everywhere these days, and it is pure myth. Justice Scalia has been more than willing to ignore the Constitution's plain language, and he has a knack for coming out on the conservative side in cases with an ideological bent. The conservative partisans leading the war on activist judges are just as inconsistent: they like judicial activism just fine when it advances their own agendas.

Justice Scalia's views on federalism - which now generally command a majority on the Supreme Court - are perhaps the clearest example of the problem with the conservative attack on judicial activism. When conservatives complain about activist judges, they talk about gay marriage and defendants' rights. But they do not mention the 11th Amendment, which has been twisted beyond its own plain words into a states' rights weapon to throw minorities, women and the disabled out of federal court.

The 11th Amendment says federal courts cannot hear lawsuits against a state brought by "Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." But it's been interpreted to block suits by a state's own citizens - something it clearly does not say. How to get around the Constitution's express words? In a 1991 decision, Justice Scalia wrote that "despite the narrowness of its terms," the 11th Amendment has been understood by the court "to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms." If another judge used that rationale to find rights in the Constitution, Justice Scalia's reaction would be withering. He went on, in that 1991 decision, to throw out a suit by Indian tribes who said they had been cheated by the State of Alaska.

Conservative politicians insist that courts should defer to the democratically elected branches, but conservative judges do not seem to be listening. The Supreme Court's conservative majority regularly overturns laws passed by Congress, like the Violence Against Women Act and the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The court has even established a bizarre series of hoops Congress must jump through to pass a law protecting Americans' 14th Amendment equal-protection rights. Congress must prove in many cases that the law it passed is "congruent" and "proportional" to the harm being addressed. Even John Noonan Jr., an appeals court judge appointed by President Reagan, has said these new rules - which Justice Scalia eagerly embraces - reduce Congress to the level of an "administrative agency."

Justice Scalia likes to boast that he follows his strict-constructionist philosophy wherever it leads, even if it leads to results he disagrees with. But it is uncanny how often it leads him just where he already wanted to go. In his view, the 14th Amendment prohibits Michigan from using affirmative action in college admissions, but lets Texas make gay sex a crime. (The Supreme Court has held just the opposite.) He is dismissive when inmates invoke the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment to challenge prison conditions. But he is supportive when wealthy people try to expand the "takings clause" to block the government from regulating their property.

The inconsistency of the conservative war on judges was apparent in the Terri Schiavo ordeal. Mr. DeLay, an outspoken critic of activist courts, does not want to investigate the federal trial judge and the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit for judicial activism, but for the opposite: for refusing to overturn the Florida state courts' legal decisions, and Michael Schiavo's decisions about his wife's medical care.

The classic example of conservative inconsistency remains Bush v. Gore. Not only did the court's conservative bloc trample on the Florida state courts and stop the vote counting - it declared its ruling would not be a precedent for future cases. How does Justice Scalia explain that decision? In a recent New Yorker profile, he is quoted as saying, with startling candor, that "the only issue was whether we should put an end to it, after three weeks of looking like a fool in the eyes of the world." That, of course, isn't a constitutional argument - it is an unapologetic defense of judicial activism.

When it comes to judicial activism, conservative judges are no better than liberal ones - and, it must be said, no worse. If conservatives are going to continue their war on the judiciary, though, they should be honest. They do not want to get rid of judicial activists, a standard that would bring down even Justice Scalia. They want to rid the courts of judges who disagree with them.

Sunday, April 17

America's Unregulated Future?

April 17, 2005

The Unregulated Offensive

By JEFFREY ROSEN

I. Justice Thomas's Other Controversy

If you think back to Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court confirmation hearings in 1991, what most likely comes to mind are the explosive allegations of sexual harassment made by the law professor Anita Hill. Years from now, however, when observers of the court look back on the hearings, they may well focus on a clash that preceded Hill's accusations -- an acrimonious exchange that few remember today.

Early in the hearings, Joseph Biden, the Delaware Democrat who was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, voiced a concern about Thomas's judicial philosophy. In particular, he singled out a speech that Thomas gave in 1987 in which he expressed an affinity for the ideas of legal scholars like Richard A. Epstein. A law professor at the University of Chicago, Epstein was notorious in legal circles for his thesis that many of the laws underpinning the modern welfare state are unconstitutional. Thomas tried to assure Biden that he was interested in ideas like Epstein's only as a matter of ''political theory'' and that he would not actually implement them as a Supreme Court justice. Biden, apparently unpersuaded, picked up a copy of Epstein's 1985 book, ''Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain,'' and theatrically waved it in the air. Anyone who embraced the book's extreme thesis, he seemed to be suggesting, was unfit to sit on the court.

At the time, it was impossible to know whether Biden was right to worry. He was surely right, though, that Epstein was promoting a legal philosophy far more radical in its implications than anything entertained by Antonin Scalia, then, as now, the court's most irascible conservative. As Epstein sees it, all individuals have certain inherent rights and liberties, including ''economic'' liberties, like the right to property and, more crucially, the right to part with it only voluntarily. These rights are violated any time an individual is deprived of his property without compensation -- when it is stolen, for example, but also when it is subjected to governmental regulation that reduces its value or when a government fails to provide greater security in exchange for the property it seizes. In Epstein's view, these libertarian freedoms are not only defensible as a matter of political philosophy but are also protected by the United States Constitution. Any government that violates them is, by his lights, repressive. One such government, in Epstein's worldview, is our government. When Epstein gazes across America, he sees a nation in the chains of minimum-wage laws and zoning regulations. His theory calls for the country to be deregulated in a manner not seen since before Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal.

After Thomas joined the Supreme Court, Biden's warnings seemed prescient. In 1995, echoes of Epstein's ideas could be clearly heard in one of Thomas's opinions. By a 5-4 majority in United States v. Lopez, the court struck down a federal law banning guns in school zones, arguing that the law fell outside Congress's constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. Lopez was a judicial landmark: it was the first time since the New Deal that the court had limited the power of the federal government on those grounds. Thomas, who sided with the majority, chose to write a separate opinion in which he suggested that even his conservative colleagues had not gone far enough. The real problem, he wrote, was not just with the law at hand but with the larger decision of the court during the New Deal to abandon the judicial doctrines of the 19th century that established severe limits on the government's power. He assailed his liberal colleagues for characterizing ''the first 150 years of this Court's case law as a 'wrong turn.''' He continued, ''If anything, the 'wrong turn' was the Court's dramatic departure in the 1930's from a century and a half of precedent.''

Thomas did not cite Epstein directly in his opinion. But to anyone familiar with Epstein's writings, the similarities were striking. Indeed, Thomas's argument closely resembled one Epstein had made eight years earlier in ''The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power'' in the Virginia Law Review -- so closely, in fact, that Sanford Levinson, a liberal law professor at the University of Texas, accused Thomas of outright intellectual theft. (''The ordinary standards governing attribution of sources -- the violation of which constitutes plagiarism -- seem not to apply in Justice Thomas's chambers,'' Levinson wrote in the Texas Law Review.) Biden's fear that Epstein's ideas might be written into law had apparently been realized. And the fear would continue to be realized in other courts throughout the 90's as a small but energetic set of lower-court judges, sympathetic to libertarian arguments, tried to strike down aspects of the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act and other laws, challenging powers of the federal government that had come to be widely accepted during the second half of the 20th century.


Chief Justice William Rehnquist is expected to announce his resignation sometime this year, perhaps before the end of the court's current term in June. Rehnquist's retirement would create at least one confirmation hearing for a new justice, and two hearings if President George W. Bush chooses to nominate one of the current justices to be chief justice. At the same time, there is a political battle looming in the Senate over seven federal appellate-court candidates whose nominations were blocked by Senate Democrats during Bush's first term but who were renominated by the president after his re-election. Many liberals and centrists worry, and many conservatives hope, that the doctrine favored by these judicial candidates is originalism, the stated constitutional theory of Scalia. Originalists don't like interpreting the Constitution in light of present-day social developments and are generally skeptical of constitutional rights -- like the right to have an abortion -- that don't appear explicitly in the text of the Constitution. At least in theory, those in the originalist camp champion judicial restraint and states' rights.

But as Thomas's presence on the court suggests, it is perhaps just as likely that the next justice -- or chief justice -- will be sympathetic to the less well-known but increasingly active conservative judicial movement that Epstein represents. It is sometimes known as the Constitution in Exile movement, after a phrase introduced in 1995 by Douglas Ginsburg, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. (Ginsburg is probably best known as the Supreme Court nominee, put forward by Ronald Reagan, who withdrew after confessing to having smoked marijuana.) By ''Constitution in Exile,'' Ginsburg meant to identify legal doctrines that established firm limitations on state and federal power before the New Deal. Unlike many originalists, most adherents of the Constitution in Exile movement are not especially concerned about states' rights or judicial deference to legislatures; instead, they encourage judges to strike down laws on behalf of rights that don't appear explicitly in the Constitution. In addition to the scholars who articulate the movement's ideals and the judges who sympathize with them, the Constitution in Exile is defended by a litigation arm, consisting of dozens of self-styled ''freedom-based'' public-interest law firms that bring cases in state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court.

Critics of the movement note, with some anxiety, that it has no shortage of targets. Cass Sunstein, a law professor at the University of Chicago (and a longtime colleague of Epstein's), will soon publish a book on the Constitution in Exile movement called ''Fundamentally Wrong.'' As Sunstein, who describes himself as a moderate, recently explained to me, success, as the movement defines it, would mean that ''many decisions of the Federal Communications Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and possibly the National Labor Relations Board would be unconstitutional. It would mean that the Social Security Act would not only be under political but also constitutional stress. Many of the Constitution in Exile people think there can't be independent regulatory commissions, so the Security and Exchange Commission and maybe even the Federal Reserve would be in trouble. Some applications of the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act would be struck down as beyond Congress's commerce power.'' In what Sunstein described as the ''extreme nightmare scenario,'' the right of individuals to freedom of contract would be so vigorously interpreted that minimum-wage and maximum-hour laws would also be jeopardized.

Any movement with such ambitious goals must be patient and take the long view about its prospects for success. Michael Greve, an active defender of the Constitution in Exile at Washington's conservative American Enterprise Institute, argues that to achieve its goals, the movement ultimately needs not just one or two but four more Supreme Court justices sympathetic to its cause, as well as a larger transformation in the overall political and legal culture. ''I think what is really needed here is a fundamental intellectual assault on the entire New Deal edifice,'' he says. ''We want to withdraw judicial support for the entire modern welfare state. I'd retire and play golf if I could get there.''

II. Glory Days

All restoration fantasies have a golden age, a lost world that is based, at least to a degree, in historical fact. For the Constitution in Exile movement, that world is the era of Republican dominance in the United States from 1896 through the Roaring Twenties. Even as the Progressive movement gathered steam, seeking to protect workers from what it saw as the ravages of an unregulated market, American courts during that period steadfastly preserved an ideal of free enterprise, routinely striking down laws that were said to restrict economic competition.

The most famous constitutional battle of the time was the 1905 Supreme Court case Lochner v. New York, which challenged a law that was passed by the New York State Legislature, establishing a maximum number of working hours for bakers. The court struck down the law on the grounds that it violated the bakers' freedom of contract, which was arguably, but not explicitly, included in the 14th Amendment's protections of ''liberty'' and ''property.'' In a dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. objected that ''The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,'' referring to the celebrated Social Darwinist and advocate of laissez-faire economics.

Even after the election of Roosevelt in 1932, the Supreme Court continued to invoke laissez-faire economics to strike down federal laws, including signature New Deal legislation like the National Industrial Recovery Act. In February 1937, Roosevelt threatened to pack the court with justices who would presumably be more deferential to national regulation of the economy. Within a month, the court backed down, upholding a state law imposing a minimum wage for women and minors. (The majority opinion noted that ''the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the recent period of depression'' had dislodged old laissez-faire nostrums about the equal bargaining power of workers and employers.) The following year, in the Carolene Products case, the court announced that it would uphold all economic regulations unless no reasonable person could believe them to be rational. Today, the conventional wisdom among liberal and conservative legal thinkers alike is that Lochner was decided incorrectly and that the court's embrace of judicial restraint on economic matters in 1937 was a triumph for democracy.

Members of the Constitution in Exile movement do not share this view. Not long ago, I visited Greve in his office on 17th Street in Washington. Greve, a witty and sardonic libertarian, is the American Enterprise Institute's John G. Searle Scholar (his benefactor was a pharmaceutical magnate), and over the course of a long conversation, he explained that 1937 was, in his opinion, an unmitigated disaster, resulting in the judicial abandonment of constitutional limits on government power that are inherent in the nature of a free society and the creation of a regulatory behemoth. As the administrative state ballooned during the 60's and 70's, judicial deference became even more pervasive: new independent regulatory agencies, from the Environmental Protection Agency to the Federal Communications Commission, began issuing a slew of regulations. To Greve's dismay, much of the regulatory state is politically quite popular; even a Republican Congress, he acknowledged, seems unlikely to roll back most post-New Deal programs and regulations. ''Judicial activism will have to be deployed,'' he said. ''It's plain that the idea of judicial deference was a dead end for conservatives from the get-go.''

Now 48, Greve was born in Germany and came to embrace a libertarian outlook during his undergraduate years at the University of Hamburg, from which he graduated in 1981. That year, he visited the United States on a Fulbright and ended up at Cornell for a doctorate in government. (''I consider myself a refugee from the welfare state,'' he said with a chuckle.) His Ph.D. contrasted liberal environmental litigation in Germany and the United States. Greve was frustrated but also impressed by the way that well-financed liberal groups like Ralph Nader's Public Citizen worked in the courts to expand the reach of environmental laws, and he decided that the conservative movement needed to create organizations that would do exactly the opposite.

One of Greve's goals at the American Enterprise Institute is to convince more mainstream conservatives that traditional federalism -- which is skeptical of federal, but not state, power -- is only half right. In his view, states can threaten economic liberty just as significantly as the federal government. He is still exercised by the lawsuit brought in the 90's by 46 states against the tobacco companies, which resulted in a $246 billion settlement. ''Taking the tobacco settlement down would have a huge public impact -- that would push you in the right direction,'' he said, taking a long drag on a cigarette.

Although Greve's liberal critics have argued that resurrecting strict constitutional limits on federal and state powers would essentially mean a return to the unregulated climate of the Gilded Age, Greve emphasized that he doesn't have the Gilded Age in mind. The ''modern, vibrant, mobile'' and global economy of the 21st century, he argued, is competitive enough to regulate itself in most areas. Though he envisions a role for government in protecting against egregious forms of coercion, force and fraud, all other abuses would be regulated by private agreements among citizens. ''I don't think much would be lost if we overturned federal wetlands regulations or if we repealed the Endangered Species Act, just by way of illustration,'' he said.

Greve expressed cautious optimism that his views will get a sympathetic hearing from some of the federal appellate judges renominated this year by the president. He said he is especially happy that Bush has tapped William Pryor, the former attorney general of Alabama. Greve noted that in one of the big Supreme Court cases involving the limits of federal power, which ultimately invalidated parts of the Violence Against Women Act, Pryor wrote a brief that Greve and other libertarians greatly admired. ''Bill Pryor is the key to this puzzle; there's nobody like him,'' Greve said. ''I think he's sensational. He gets almost all of it.''

III. The Network

The idea of creating a network of activist conservative litigation groups was proposed in the early 70's by Lewis Powell, a corporate lawyer and future Supreme Court justice. In the years following the defeat of the Goldwater Republicans in 1964, conservatives were casting about for a new political strategy. At the same time, business interests were alarmed by the growth of the regulatory state and, in particular, the marked increase in environmental litigation. In 1971, Powell wrote a landmark memo for the United States Chamber of Commerce urging a counterattack. In addition to encouraging conservatives to develop a systematic and long-term effort to spread their ideas in the media, Powell recommended that conservatives should get over their aversion to judicial activism. ''Especially with an activist-minded Supreme Court,'' he wrote, ''the Judiciary may be the most important instrument for social, economic and political change.''

At the time, Powell's idea was being echoed in California by a group of conservatives close to Ronald Reagan, who had recently been re-elected governor. Reagan, who pledged to reform welfare in his 1970 campaign, set up a task force to do so, headed by his chief of staff, Edwin Meese III. The resulting reforms, which restricted welfare eligibility and cut the state's welfare rolls by more than 250,000 in three years, were attacked in the courts by liberal groups. Reagan's supporters were infuriated that there were no conservative groups that could respond in kind. ''The liberals were using the courts,'' Meese recalled recently during a conversation in his office at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. ''We wanted to make it a fair fight.''

According to a history of conservative legal activism published by Heritage, ''Bringing Justice to the People,'' the first person to take up Powell's challenge, in the early 1970's, was John Simon Fluor, a wealthy Reagan supporter. Fluor was upset that environmental groups had managed to delay the construction of the Alaska pipeline and the initiation of offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. After conversations with fellow Reagan supporters, including Meese, Fluor provided the seed money for the Pacific Legal Foundation, the first conservative property-rights litigation shop in the nation. It was staffed with members of the Reagan welfare-reform team and incorporated in 1973.

Other conservative business interests quickly replicated Fluor's model. In 1975, money from the major oil companies helped to create the National Legal Center for the Public Interest, an umbrella organization for several regional litigation groups. Each group's focus was determined by its location. The most influential spinoff group to emerge was the Mountain States Legal Foundation, financed by the beer magnate Joseph Coors, which was set up in 1977 to challenge federal land-use and natural-resources regulations, long a source of political resistance in the West. (The foundation's distinguished alumni of the period include Gale Norton, now secretary of the interior, and Jon Kyl, now a senator from Arizona.)

Though these conservative groups clearly served the interests of local businesses, they also attracted a number of libertarians, many of whom were not always consistent supporters of big business. One of the more thoughtful of these is Chip Mellor, who joined the Mountain States Legal Foundation in the late 70's and is now the head of the Institute for Justice, a libertarian public-interest law firm in Washington. When I visited him recently at his office near the White House (with an impressive corner view of the Old Executive Office Building), he spoke engagingly of his youthful idealism. ''I came out of the protests of the 1960's,'' he recalled, ''where I was dissatisfied with the right and the left.'' He immersed himself in the writings of Milton Friedman, the Nobel Prize-winning free-market economist, as well as those of the libertarian novelist Ayn Rand. ''It was quite illuminating for me to read Friedman and Rand and to realize that you could not divorce economic liberty and private property rights from the truly free individual,'' Mellor said. ''I came to see that societies where those rights were taken away inevitably led to people impoverished in monetary wealth and basic liberties.''

When he was a law student at the University of Denver, Mellor saw a recruiting flier for the Mountain States Legal Foundation and was intrigued by its mention of property rights. Sporting long hair and a handlebar mustache, he showed up without an appointment, but hit it off nevertheless with the foundation's president, James Watt. (Watt would later achieve renown for his knockdown battles with environmentalists as Reagan's secretary of the interior.) By 1982, Mellor had risen to become the acting president of the foundation, and he soon hired a young law-school graduate and fellow libertarian named Clint Bolick. The two became fast friends and pledged to sustain their passion for libertarian principles above partisan politics. (A fierce defender of Clarence Thomas during his nomination battle, Bolick left the Republican Party not long ago in protest over its anti-immigrant policies and the Iraq war.)

Bolick, whose sunny idealism is hard to resist, still gets indignant when he recalls how Mellor came to part ways with Mountain States. It began when the foundation filed a free-speech lawsuit opposing an exclusive cable-TV franchise granted by the city of Denver to a local businessman who happened to be a friend of Joseph Coors. When Coors resigned from the board to protest the direction that Mountain States seemed to moving in, it set in motion a process that led, a year later, to Mellor being fired. ''Chip and I discovered that there is a world of difference between an organization that is pro-business and an organization that is pro-free enterprise,'' Bolick told me recently. ''We learned that some of the influential backers of the movement were more pro-business than pro-free enterprise.'' After the firing, Mellor said, he and Bolick sat in Mellor's backyard with tears in their eyes. ''We pledged this is wrong, and someday we're going to do it right,'' he said.

They soon got their chance. After stints in Washington with the Reagan administration, in which Mellor was a deputy general counsel at the Department of Energy and Bolick was an assistant at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (then led by Clarence Thomas), the two men, in 1991, persuaded Charles Koch, an oil and gas magnate, to give them $350,000 a year in seed money from his private foundation to start the Institute for Justice. (To this day, the institute does not actively solicit corporate financing, and its $6.6 million annual budget is far lower than those of its liberal counterparts, like the A.C.L.U.) Before long, Mellor and Bolick had achieved victories in lower courts for clients without deep pockets. In a series of cases, they challenged state licensing laws that made it hard for small-business entrepreneurs to break into highly regulated professions. Their successful clients included limo drivers in Las Vegas, African-American hair braiders in San Diego and casket sellers in Tennessee. When Mellor gave me a tour of his office, he proudly pointed out an engraved tombstone of appreciation from the casket sellers, which sits in the institute's reception area.

IV. The (Other) Rights of Man

Defending the right of small businessmen to challenge local monopolies may have been necessary and noble, but for the movement it represented a small piece of the puzzle. If Mellor and Bolick and others like them were to transform the Supreme Court's approach to the entire post-New Deal regulatory state -- to ''resurrect the Constitution in Exile,'' as Bolick puts it -- they would have to develop a sophisticated jurisprudential framework.

Early on, the movement found its intellectual guru in Richard Epstein. In the words of Michael Greve, Epstein is ''the intellectual patron saint of everybody in this movement.'' Like Bolick, Epstein is too much of a libertarian purist to be a party loyalist. (''Our president is a most inconsistent classical liberal, to be charitable,'' he says. ''He's terrible on trade and a huge spender and not completely candid about the parlous situation Social Security is in.'') But his devotion to -- and influence on -- the Constitution in Exile is unsurpassed.

''Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain,'' still in print 20 years after its publication, purports to specify the conditions under which government can rightfully impose regulations and taxes that reduce the value of private property. Drawing on the political philosophy of John Locke, Epstein argues that before the existence of government, individuals in what political theorists call the ''state of nature'' have an inherent right of autonomy, which entitles them to acquire property by dint of their labor and to dispose of it only as they see fit through voluntary transfer of goods. Epstein also maintains that any form of government coercion -- including taxation or other forced transfers of wealth -- can be reconciled with the principles of personal freedom only if it makes individuals at least as well off as they were before the tax or regulation was imposed. Epstein's key insight, as the Constitution in Exile adherents see it, is that economic regulations are just as coercive as other involuntary wealth transfers. He insists that if the government wants to reduce the value of an individual's property -- with zoning restrictions, for example -- it has to compensate him for the lost value.

Moving from political theory to constitutional law, Epstein argues that the framers of the United States Constitution recognized these limitations on governmental power in the Takings Clause of the Constitution, which says that ''private property'' cannot be taken for public use ''without just compensation.'' According to Epstein, the Takings Clause prevents the government from redistributing wealth in any form without appropriate compensation and that a proper understanding of the clause calls into question ''many of the heralded reforms and institutions of the 20th century: zoning, rent control, workers' compensation laws, transfer payments,'' as well as ''progressive taxation.'' Liberal governmental reforms could be sustained, Epstein argues, only if the government were to compensate individuals for the lost value of their property or to make everyone better off in exchange for their taxes. ''This simple theory of governance could be expanded to cover all taxes, all regulations, all shift in liability schemes,'' Epstein wrote in an intellectual autobiography. ''It is also the recipe for striking down the New Deal.''

''Takings'' made Epstein a star on the Republican circuit, and he quickly became a favorite intellectual of Edwin Meese, then Reagan's attorney general. (Perhaps inspired by Epstein's arguments, Meese once announced at a Justice Department conference that a ''revolution'' in economic liberty was a possibility.) In 1986, Meese's office contacted Epstein and asked him to make a scholarly inquiry into Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. The following year, Epstein published the results of his research in ''The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power'' (the article that Clarence Thomas would apparently later draw on in his Lopez opinion). Epstein argued that before the New Deal, Congress had the power to regulate only the channels of interstate commerce (railroads, for example) but not manufacturing, which doesn't qualify as commerce, or the trade of goods that don't cross state lines. The court, he maintained, was wrong, in its landmark 1942 ruling in Wickard v. Filburn, to allow the federal government to regulate the wheat production of a farmer who grew it for his own consumption. (The government had argued that private consumption was reducing demand for wheat that traveled across state lines.) Though he dutifully noted that his conclusion ''seems radical,'' Epstein called on the court to reverse its error by returning to the more limited pre-New Deal understanding of Congress's power to regulate the economy.

From the outset, Epstein's ideas ran into resistance from traditional judicial conservatives. In October 1984, Epstein clashed publicly with Antonin Scalia, his former colleague at the University of Chicago, in a panel discussion convened at the libertarian Cato Institute. Scalia, speaking first before a standing-room-only crowd, defended the view that judges should restrain themselves from overturning legislation in the name of rights or liberties not clearly and expressly enumerated in the Constitution. ''Every era raises its own peculiar threat to constitutional democracy,'' he said. ''The reversal of a half-century of judicial restraint in the economic realm'' -- Epstein's stated project -- ''comes within that category.'' As a traditional federalist, Scalia had his own qualms about the unconstitutionality of unlimited federal power, but he was not in favor of striking down laws in the name of ambiguous and contestable economic rights. Scalia argued that conservatives who had criticized earlier courts, like the Warren court, for liberal judicial activism now faced a ''moment of truth.'' They had to show the courage to reject conservative judicial activism as well.

When Epstein heard what Scalia had to say, he threw away his prepared remarks and delivered a spontaneous attack. Freely admitting that he was questioning the conservative ''conventional wisdom,'' Epstein insisted that judges should be much more aggressive in protecting economic liberty. ''There are many blatantly inappropriate statutes that cry out for a quick and easy kill,'' Epstein said, citing minimum-wage laws and other ''legislative regulation of the economy.'' He excoriated the Supreme Court for refusing to strike these laws down. ''One only has to read the opinions of the Supreme Court on economic liberties and property rights to realize that these opinions are intellectually incoherent,'' he concluded. ''Some movement in the direction of judicial activism is clearly indicated.''

V. Permanent Exile?

By 1995, the Constitution in Exile movement had reached what appeared to be a turning point. The Republicans had recently taken over both houses of Congress after pledging, in their Contract With America, to rein in the federal government. And the Supreme Court, by rediscovering limits on Congress's power in Lopez, seemed to be answering the call. For conservative advocacy groups and public-interest law firms, the possibilities for litigation looked encouraging.

In a reflection of the new mood, Douglas Ginsburg wrote an article in Regulation, a libertarian magazine published by the Cato Institute, calling for the resurrection of ''the Constitution in Exile.'' He noted that for 60 years, proper constitutional limits on government power had been abandoned. ''The memory of these ancient exiles, banished for standing in opposition to unlimited government,'' he wrote with a hint of wistful grandiosity, ''is kept alive by a few scholars who labor on in the hope of a restoration, a second coming of the Constitution of liberty -- even if perhaps not in their own lifetimes.'' While not all the leaders of the movement immediately embraced Ginsburg's catch phrase (Edwin Meese says that the phrase Constitution in Exile suggests incorrectly that they have retired from the field of battle), among some legal conservatives it became a rallying cry.

The restoration did not occur. The Rehnquist court in recent years has proved more sympathetic to enforcing limits on Congress's power than any court since 1937: between 1995 and 2003, the court struck down 33 federal laws on constitutional grounds -- a higher annual rate than any other Supreme Court in history. But the so-called federalism revolution on the Rehnquist court did not deliver all of what the proponents of the Constitution in Exile had hoped. Every time a lower court appeared to be on the brink of successfully striking down a federal statute with substantial political support, like the Endangered Species Act, the Supreme Court wrote a hedging opinion reassuring the country that the justices intended to challenge Congressional power only at the margins.

''I think we failed,'' Michael Greve said flatly when I asked him about the past decade of Supreme Court litigation. ''There are encouraging signs that with the right strategic moves you can make some headway, until the court looks the principle in the eye and says, 'Oh, my God,' and pulls back.'' He rattled off a series of property-rights cases in which the Supreme Court had declared (in his mocking paraphrase), ''Oh, no, this would be too inconvenient, too constraining for government.''

During the current term, the Supreme Court has heard three cases involving questions of economic liberty that, according to Greve, represent the most significant tests in a decade of the power of the Constitution in Exile movement. Kelo v. New London, which was argued before the court in February, concerned Susette Kelo, a woman who sued the city of New London, Conn., after it used its power of eminent domain to seize 90 acres of property, including her house. The city planned to turn the parcel over to a private developer in order to increase the tax base and revitalize the city. Chip Mellor's organization, the Institute for Justice, represented Kelo, whom the institute's lawyers had sought out because she seemed like a sympathetic victim. Standing before the justices, Kelo's lawyer, Scott G. Bullock, asked the court to reject the claim that as long as the state could point to a plausible public purpose for the taking of private property (like increasing the tax base), it could appropriate people's homes. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, however, seemed unimpressed by the suggestion that courts should second-guess the economic judgments of legislatures.

O'Connor and other justices seemed similarly skeptical during the second case, Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., which they heard later that same morning. Lingle involved a challenge to a rent-control regulation in Hawaii. Richard Epstein filed a brief for the Cato Institute that argued that the court should abandon its longstanding presumption that economic regulations are rational and ask instead whether the law, in fact, makes economic sense or is simply a ''naked wealth transfer.''

Randy Barnett, a libertarian scholar at the Boston University School of Law and the Cato Institute, was the plaintiff's lawyer in Ashcroft v. Raich, another key Supreme Court showdown, which was argued before the court last fall. Raich is a challenge to the federal government's attempt to enforce drug laws that conflict with the effort by California (and 10 other states) to allow the use of medical marijuana. Barnett represented Angela Raich, a woman who suffered from cancer that often confined her to a wheelchair but who said she felt much better after being prescribed medical marijuana. The author of a provocative book, ''Restoring the Lost Constitution,'' Barnett argues that courts should evaluate economic regulations with a ''presumption of liberty'' rather than with a presumption of deference. His book identifies a series of regulations that he says the courts should consider constitutionally suspect, from environmental laws to laws forbidding the mere possession of ordinary firearms, therapeutic drugs or pornography. ''The court has not really limited Congress's power very much,'' Barnett says. ''But the fact that it was willing to limit it at all has been an important principle. If it now basically throws in the towel, it will be pretty demoralizing to this whole side.''

In February, a day after the Kelo and Lingle cases were argued before the court, I phoned Epstein and asked him how he thought they had gone. ''I think the exile's going to be a little longer after yesterday,'' he said with a sigh. ''It's a very sad day to watch these guys work.'' Epstein expressed confidence that even if his side loses, the battle for the Constitution in Exile will continue at the state level -- ''the emotional grab of those eminent-domain cases is so strong,'' he said -- but confessed that he had little hope, for now, in the Supreme Court. ''They really have gone back to the extreme 1937 reaction that anything that concerns the economic well-being of this nation is simply a political matter,'' he said. ''If the Constitution is an annoying obstacle, they'll just get it out of their way.''

VI. Packing the Courts

If supporters of the Constitution in Exile lose all three cases now before the Supreme Court, what happens next? The general consensus, according to Greve, is that the movement should focus its energies on the appointment of sympathetic judges. ''I think the judicial appointments are what matters most of all,'' Greve says. ''And Bush's renomination of the rejected judges is a way of saying, Let's cram the same judges back in their face. That's intended as a sign that they mean business.''

Three candidates recently renominated by Bush for positions on the federal appellate courts are sympathetic to the ideas of the Constitution in Exile movement. In addition to William Pryor, the former attorney general of Alabama whom Greve praises, there is Janice Rogers Brown, a justice on the California Supreme Court and an outspoken economic libertarian. An African-American and a daughter of sharecroppers, Brown has been promoted by many libertarians as an ideal Supreme Court candidate. Known for her vigorous criticism of the post-New Deal regulatory state, Brown has called 1937, the year the Supreme Court began to uphold the New Deal, ''the triumph of our socialist revolution,'' adding in another speech that ''protection of property was a major casualty of the revolution of 1937.'' She has praised the court's invalidation of maximum-hour and minimum-wage laws in the Progressive era, and at her Senate confirmation hearing in 2003, she referred disparagingly to ''the dichotomy that eventually develops where economic liberty -- property -- is put on a different level than political liberties.''

From Greve's point of view, another sympathizer whom Bush has nominated for a federal appellate judgeship is William G. Myers III, who was the chief lawyer at the Department of the Interior and a lifelong advocate for mining and grazing interests. Democrats in the Senate have expressed special concern about Myers's narrow view of Congress's power to pass environmental regulations: he has criticized the ''fallacious belief that the centralized government can promote environmentalism'' and has denounced the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act as ''regulatory excesses.'' He also helped to found Cattlemen Advocating Through Litigation, a conservative group that challenges environmental regulations in court. On March 17, he was the first candidate approved by the Judiciary Committee, on a party line vote.

For Democrats in the Senate, a main cause of concern is not only the principles that these judges embrace but also the potential conflicts of interests that their loyalties can create. For example, Douglas Ginsburg, the judge who introduced the phrase Constitution in Exile, serves on the board of a group called the Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment, or FREE, which favors free-market solutions to environmental problems. As Douglas Kendall of the Community Rights Counsel, an environmental watchdog group, has reported, between 1992 and 2001 Ginsburg took more than a dozen all-expenses-paid trips, mainly to Montana, under FREE's auspices, where he often participated in its judicial-education seminars. In 1999, a constitutional challenge to emission regulations in the Clean Air Act was accepted for argument before Ginsburg. The lawyer who was challenging the regulations on behalf of several industry groups, Edward Warren, had also served on the board of FREE. Ginsburg joined an opinion accepting Warren's argument that the emission regulations were unconstitutional. A dissenting opinion charged the majority with ignoring ''the last half century of Supreme Court jurisprudence,'' and the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision two years later in an acerbic opinion written by Scalia.

The battle over the ideologies and allegiances of appellate judges is, of course, something of a dress rehearsal for the Supreme Court nomination to come. Greve and his colleague Christopher DeMuth, the president of the American Enterprise Institute, say they are heartened by the judges reportedly on Bush's short list, many of whom they consider broadly sympathetic to their views. ''I think the president and his top staff have shown really good taste in their court of appeals nominations,'' DeMuth told me during a visit to the institute, ''and when the Supreme Court opening comes up, they will be very strongly inclined to nominate people from our side.''

DeMuth was especially enthusiastic about the possible candidacy of Michael W. McConnell, a federal appellate judge in Denver and a former University of Chicago law professor who worked with DeMuth at the Office of Management and Budget in the Reagan administration. Greve explained that McConnell not only has ''impeccable social conservative credentials'' but also will ''give you a vision of federalism that looks like the Constitution we once had, and he's intellectually powerful enough to pull it off on the court.'' Most of the other names on Bush's short list have similar qualities: J. Michael Luttig, a federal appellate judge in Virginia, is a vigorous proponent of the view that some federal environmental laws exceed Congress's powers to regulate interstate commerce; John Roberts, a federal judge in Washington, has also questioned whether some applications of the Endangered Species Act exceed Congress's regulatory powers.

The influence of the Constitution in Exile movement on judicial nominations is not always clear, since the concerns of the White House often overlap with concerns of conservatives broadly sympathetic to business interests or the concerns of more traditional federalists. ''If you mentioned the phrase 'Constitution in Exile' in White House meetings I was in, no one would know what the hell you were talking about,'' a former White House official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the topic, told me. ''But a lot of people believe in the principles of the movement without knowing the phrase. And the nominees will reflect that.'' According to the former official, during Bush's first term, David S. Addington, the vice president's counsel, would often press the Justice Department to object that proposed laws and regulations exceeded the limits of Congress's power. ''People like Addington hate the federal government, hate Congress,'' the former official said. ''They're in a deregulatory mood,'' he added, and they believe that ''the second term is the time to really do this stuff.''

VII. America, Deregulated

If they win -- if, years from now, the Constitution is brought back from its decades of arguable exile -- and federal environmental laws are struck down, the movement's loyalists do not expect the levels of air and water pollution to rise catastrophically. They are confident that local regulations and private contracts between businesses and neighbors will determine the pollution levels that each region demands. Nor do they expect vulnerable workers to be exploited in sweatshops if labor unions are weakened: they anticipate that entrepreneurial workers in a mobile economy will bargain for the working conditions that their talents deserve. Historic districts, as they see it, will not be eviscerated if zoning laws are scaled back, but they do imagine there will be fewer brownstones and more McMansions. In exchange for these trade-offs, they insist, individual liberty -- the indispensable guarantee of self-fulfillment and happiness -- would flourish far more extensively than it does today.

Of course, there would be losers as well as winners in a deregulated market economy, and history provides plenty of reasons to be concerned about the possibility of abuse. Even the relatively modest deregulation of today's increasingly global and fluid U.S. economy may provide something of a cautionary tale. From Enron to illegal trading by mutual funds and bid-rigging in the insurance industry, corporate scandals are keeping consumer advocates like Eliot Spitzer quite busy. America, at the moment, is engaged in an important debate about the relative merits and dangers of the market economy, and the advocates of the Constitution in Exile are aware that they cannot achieve ultimate success without persuading a majority of the American people to embrace their vision.

But a political transformation in their favor remains, for the moment, remote, and they appear content, even eager, to turn to the courts to win the victories that are eluding them in the political arena. Advocates of the movement are entirely sincere in their belief that the regulatory state is unconstitutional as well as immoral and that a principled reading of the Constitution requires vigorous enforcement of fundamental limits on state power. Nevertheless, it is a troubling paradox that conservatives, who continue to denounce liberals for using courts to thwart the will of the people in cases involving abortion and gay marriage, now appear to be succumbing to precisely the same temptation. If the lessons of the past 60 years teach us anything, when judges try to short-circuit intensely contested democratic debates, from the New Deal cases to Roe v. Wade, they may provoke a fierce political backlash that sets back the movement they are trying to advance. In this sense, even if the Constitution in Exile movement manages to transform the courts before it has transformed the country, it may find that it has won less than it hoped.

Jeffrey Rosen, a law professor at George Washington University, is a frequent contributor to the magazine. He is at work on a book about democracy and the courts, to be published next year.

Friday, April 15

Hacking the Papal Election

Crypto-Gram: April 15, 2005

"I'm sure there are negotiations and deals and influencing -- cardinals are mortal men, after all, and such things are part of how humans come to agreement.

What are the lessons here? First, open systems conducted within a known group make voting fraud much harder. Every step of the election process is observed by everyone, and everyone knows everyone, which makes it harder for someone to get away with anything. Second, small and simple elections are easier to secure. This kind of process works to elect a Pope or a club president, but quickly becomes unwieldy for a large-scale election. The only way manual systems work is through a pyramid-like scheme, with small groups reporting their manually obtained results up the chain to more central tabulating authorities.

And a third and final lesson: when an election process is left to develop over the course of a couple thousand years, you end up with something surprisingly good."

Why America pays so much for so little (health care)

The Medical Money Pit

By PAUL KRUGMAN

A dozen years ago, everyone was talking about a health care crisis. But then the issue faded from view: a few years of good data led many people to conclude that H.M.O.'s and other innovations had ended the historic trend of rising medical costs.

But the pause in the growth of health care costs in the 1990's proved temporary. Medical costs are once again rising rapidly, and our health care system is once again in crisis. So now is a good time to ask why other advanced countries manage to spend so much less than we do, while getting better results.

Before I get to the numbers, let me deal with the usual problem one encounters when trying to draw lessons from foreign experience: somebody is sure to bring up the supposed horrors of Britain's government-run system, which historically had long waiting lists for elective surgery.

In fact, Britain's system isn't as bad as its reputation - especially for lower-paid workers, whose counterparts in the United States often have no health insurance at all. And the waiting lists have gotten shorter.

But in any case, Britain isn't the country we want to look at, because its health care system is run on the cheap, with total spending per person only 40 percent as high as ours.

The countries that have something to teach us are the nations that don't pinch pennies to the same extent - like France, Germany or Canada - but still spend far less than we do. (Yes, Canada also has waiting lists, but they're much shorter than Britain's - and Canadians overwhelmingly prefer their system to ours. France and Germany don't have a waiting list problem.)

Let me rattle off some numbers.

In 2002, the latest year for which comparable data are available, the United States spent $5,267 on health care for each man, woman and child in the population. Of this, $2,364, or 45 percent, was government spending, mainly on Medicare and Medicaid. Canada spent $2,931 per person, of which $2,048 came from the government. France spent $2,736 per person, of which $2,080 was government spending.

Amazing, isn't it? U.S. health care is so expensive that our government spends more on health care than the governments of other advanced countries, even though the private sector pays a far higher share of the bills than anywhere else.

What do we get for all that money? Not much.

Most Americans probably don't know that we have substantially lower life-expectancy and higher infant-mortality figures than other advanced countries. It would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that this poor performance is entirely the result of a defective health care system; social factors, notably America's high poverty rate, surely play a role. Still, it seems puzzling that we spend so much, with so little return.

A 2003 study published in Health Affairs (one of whose authors is my Princeton colleague Uwe Reinhardt) tried to resolve that puzzle by comparing a number of measures of health services across the advanced world. What the authors found was that the United States scores high on high-tech services - we have lots of M.R.I.'s - but on more prosaic measures, like the number of doctors' visits and number of days spent in hospitals, America is only average, or even below average. There's also direct evidence that identical procedures cost far more in the U.S. than in other advanced countries.

The authors concluded that Americans spend far more on health care than their counterparts abroad - but they don't actually receive more care. The title of their article? "It's the Prices, Stupid."

Why is the price of U.S. health care so high? One answer is doctors' salaries: although average wages in France and the United States are similar, American doctors are paid much more than their French counterparts. Another answer is that America's health care system drives a poor bargain with the pharmaceutical industry.

Above all, a large part of America's health care spending goes into paperwork. A 2003 study in The New England Journal of Medicine estimated that administrative costs took 31 cents out of every dollar the United States spent on health care, compared with only 17 cents in Canada.

In my next column in this series, I'll explain why the most privatized health care system in the advanced world is also the most bloated and bureaucratic.

Exploiting Religious Ferver in Government

Frist Set to Use Religious Stage on Judicial Issue

By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK

Published: April 15, 2005

WASHINGTON, April 14 - As the Senate heads toward a showdown over the rules governing judicial confirmations, Senator Bill Frist, the majority leader, has agreed to join a handful of prominent Christian conservatives in a telecast portraying Democrats as "against people of faith" for blocking President Bush's nominees.



Fliers for the telecast, organized by the Family Research Council and scheduled to originate at a Kentucky megachurch the evening of April 24, call the day "Justice Sunday" and depict a young man holding a Bible in one hand and a gavel in the other. The flier does not name participants, but under the heading "the filibuster against people of faith," it reads: "The filibuster was once abused to protect racial bias, and it is now being used against people of faith."

Organizers say they hope to reach more than a million people by distributing the telecast to churches around the country, over the Internet and over Christian television and radio networks and stations.

Dr. Frist's spokesman said the senator's speech in the telecast would reflect his previous remarks on judicial appointments. In the past he has consistently balanced a determination "not to yield" on the president's nominees with appeals to the Democrats for compromise. He has distanced himself from the statements of others like the House majority leader, Tom DeLay, who have attacked the courts, saying they are too liberal, "run amok" or are hostile to Christianity.

The telecast, however, will put Dr. Frist in a very different context. Asked about Dr. Frist's participation in an event describing the filibuster "as against people of faith," his spokesman, Bob Stevenson, did not answer the question directly.

"Senator Frist is doing everything he can to ensure judicial nominees are treated fairly and that every senator has the opportunity to give the president their advice and consent through an up or down vote," Mr. Stevenson said, adding, "He has spoken to groups all across the nation to press that point, and as long as a minority of Democrats continue to block a vote, he will continue to do so."

Some of the nation's most influential evangelical Protestants are participating in the teleconference in Louisville, including Dr. James C. Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family; Chuck Colson, the born-again Watergate figure and founder of Prison Fellowship Ministries; and Dr. Al Mohler, president of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary.

The event is taking place as Democrats and Republicans alike are escalating their public relations campaigns in anticipation of an imminent confrontation. The Democratic minority has blocked confirmation of 10 of President Bush's judicial nominees by preventing Republicans from gaining the 60 votes needed to close debate, using the filibuster tactic often used by political minorities and most notoriously employed by opponents of civil rights.

Dr. Frist has threatened that the Republican majority might change the rules to require only a majority vote on nominees, and Democrats have vowed to bring Senate business to a standstill if he does.

On Thursday, one wavering Republican, Senator John McCain of Arizona, told a television interviewer, Chris Matthews, that he would vote against the change.

"By the way, when Bill Clinton was president, we, effectively, in the Judiciary Committee blocked a number of his nominees," Mr. McCain said.

On Thursday the Judiciary Committee sent the nomination of Thomas B. Griffith for an appellate court post to the Senate floor. Democrats say they do not intend to block Mr. Griffith's nomination.

That cleared the way for the committee to approve several previously blocked judicial appointees in the next two weeks.

The telecast also signals an escalation of the campaign for the rule change by Christian conservatives who see the current court battle as the climax of a 30-year culture war, a chance to reverse decades of legal decisions about abortion, religion in public life, gay rights and marriage.

"As the liberal, anti-Christian dogma of the left has been repudiated in almost every recent election, the courts have become the last great bastion for liberalism," Tony Perkins, president of the Family Research Council and organizer of the telecast, wrote in a message on the group's Web site. "For years activist courts, aided by liberal interest groups like the A.C.L.U., have been quietly working under the veil of the judiciary, like thieves in the night, to rob us of our Christian heritage and our religious freedoms."

Democrats accused Dr. Frist of exploiting religious faith for political ends by joining the telecast. "No party has a monopoly on faith, and for Senator Frist to participate in this kind of telecast just throws more oil on the partisan flames," said Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York.

But Mr. Perkins stood by the characterization of Democrats as hostile to faith. "What they have done is, they have targeted people for reasons of their faith or moral position," he said, referring to Democratic criticisms of nominees over their views of cases about abortion rights or public religious expressions.

"The issue of the judiciary is really something that has been veiled by this 'judicial mystique' so our folks don't really understand it, but they are beginning to connect the dots," Mr. Perkins said in an interview, reciting a string of court decisions about prayer or displays of religion.

"They were all brought about by the courts," he said.

Democrats, for their part, are already stepping up their efforts to link Dr. Frist and the rule change with conservatives statements about unaccountable judges hostile to faith.

On Thursday, Mr. Schumer released an open letter calling on Dr. Frist to denounce such attacks. "The last thing we need is inflammatory rhetoric which on its face encourages violence against judges," he wrote.

Tuesday, April 12

Citizen DV footage changes balance of power with police

Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention Unrest

By JIM DWYER
New York Times, 4/11/05


Dennis Kyne put up such a fight at a political protest last summer, the arresting officer recalled, it took four police officers to haul him down the steps of the New York Public Library and across Fifth Avenue.

"We picked him up and we carried him while he squirmed and screamed," the officer, Matthew Wohl, testified in December. "I had one of his legs because he was kicking and refusing to walk on his own."

Accused of inciting a riot and resisting arrest, Mr. Kyne was the first of the 1,806 people arrested in New York last summer during the Republican National Convention to take his case to a jury. But one day after Officer Wohl testified, and before the defense called a single witness, the prosecutor abruptly dropped all charges.

During a recess, the defense had brought new information to the prosecutor. A videotape shot by a documentary filmmaker showed Mr. Kyne agitated but plainly walking under his own power down the library steps, contradicting the vivid account of Officer Wohl, who was nowhere to be seen in the pictures. Nor was the officer seen taking part in the arrests of four other people at the library against whom he signed complaints.

A sprawling body of visual evidence, made possible by inexpensive, lightweight cameras in the hands of private citizens, volunteer observers and the police themselves, has shifted the debate over precisely what happened on the streets during the week of the convention.

For Mr. Kyne and 400 others arrested that week, video recordings provided evidence that they had not committed a crime or that the charges against them could not be proved, according to defense lawyers and prosecutors.

Among them was Alexander Dunlop, who said he was arrested while going to pick up sushi.

Last week, he discovered that there were two versions of the same police tape: the one that was to be used as evidence in his trial had been edited at two spots, removing images that showed Mr. Dunlop behaving peacefully. When a volunteer film archivist found a more complete version of the tape and gave it to Mr. Dunlop's lawyer, prosecutors immediately dropped the charges and said that a technician had cut the material by mistake.

Seven months after the convention at Madison Square Garden, criminal charges have fallen against all but a handful of people arrested that week. Of the 1,670 cases that have run their full course, 91 percent ended with the charges dismissed or with a verdict of not guilty after trial. Many were dropped without any finding of wrongdoing, but also without any serious inquiry into the circumstances of the arrests, with the Manhattan district attorney's office agreeing that the cases should be "adjourned in contemplation of dismissal."

So far, 162 defendants have either pleaded guilty or were convicted after trial, and videotapes that bolstered the prosecution's case played a role in at least some of those cases, although prosecutors could not provide details.

Besides offering little support or actually undercutting the prosecution of most of the people arrested, the videotapes also highlight another substantial piece of the historical record: the Police Department's tactics in controlling the demonstrations, parades and rallies of hundreds of thousands of people were largely free of explicit violence.

Throughout the convention week and afterward, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg said that the police issued clear warnings about blocking streets or sidewalks, and that officers moved to arrest only those who defied them. In the view of many activists - and of many people who maintain that they were passers-by and were swept into dragnets indiscriminately thrown over large groups - the police strategy appeared to be designed to sweep them off the streets on technical grounds as a show of force.

"The police develop a narrative, the defendant has a different story, and the question becomes, how do you resolve it?" said Eileen Clancy, a member of I-Witness Video, a project that assembled hundreds of videotapes shot during the convention by volunteers for use by defense lawyers.

Paul J. Browne, a police spokesman, said that videotapes often do not show the full sequence of events, and that the public should not rush to criticize officers simply because their recollections of events are not consistent with a single videotape. The Manhattan district attorney's office is reviewing the testimony of Officer Wohl at the request of Lewis B. Oliver Jr., the lawyer who represented Mr. Kyne in his arrest at the library.

The Police Department maintains that much of the videotape that has surfaced since the convention captured what Mr. Browne called the department's professional handling of the protests and parades. "My guess is that people who saw the police restraint admired it," he said.

Video is a useful source of evidence, but not an easy one to manage, because of the difficulties in finding a fleeting image in hundreds of hours of tape. Moreover, many of the tapes lack index and time markings, so cuts in the tape are not immediately apparent.

That was a problem in the case of Mr. Dunlop, who learned that his tape had been altered only after Ms. Clancy found another version of the same tape. Mr. Dunlop had been accused of pushing his bicycle into a line of police officers on the Lower East Side and of resisting arrest, but the deleted parts of the tape show him calmly approaching the police line, and later submitting to arrest without apparent incident.

A spokeswoman for the district attorney, Barbara Thompson, said the material had been cut by a technician in the prosecutor's office. "It was our mistake," she said. "The assistant district attorney wanted to include that portion" because she initially believed that it supported the charges against Mr. Dunlop. Later, however, the arresting officer, who does not appear on the video, was no longer sure of the specifics in the complaint against Mr. Dunlop.

In what appeared to be the most violent incident at the convention protests, video shot by news reporters captured the beating of a man on a motorcycle - a police officer in plainclothes - and led to the arrest of one of those involved, Jamal Holiday. After eight months in jail, he pleaded guilty last month to attempted assault, a low-level felony that will be further reduced if he completes probation. His lawyer, Elsie Chandler of the Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, said that videos had led to his arrest, but also provided support for his claim that he did not realize the man on the motorcycle was a police officer, reducing the severity of the offense.

Mr. Browne, the police spokesman, said that despite many civilians with cameras who were nearby when the officer was attacked, none of the material was turned over to police trying to identify the assailants. Footage from a freelance journalist led police to Mr. Holiday, he said.

In the bulk of the 400 cases that were dismissed based on videotapes, most involved arrests at three places - 16th Street near Union Square, 17th Street near Union Square and on Fulton Street - where police officers and civilians taped the gatherings, said Martin R. Stolar, the president of the New York City chapter of the National Lawyers Guild. Those tapes showed that the demonstrators had followed the instructions of senior officers to walk down those streets, only to have another official order their arrests.

Ms. Thompson of the district attorney's office said, "We looked at videos from a variety of sources, and in a number of cases, we have moved to dismiss."

Monday, April 11

On Not Mourning the Pope

Thoughts over the grave of John Paul II.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Friday, April 8, 2005, at 9:10 AM PT


It seems only a year or so since every talk-show host and pundit in the country was telling us that Ronald Reagan had personally demolished communism in Eastern Europe. Now we come to the end of an entire week when the mass media behaved as if we all lived in a Catholic country and were united in mourning the Dear Leader, in which this historic achievement of freedom was credited to "the Polish Pope." That isn't necessarily a contradiction: The two men might possibly have shared the work. And it's perhaps thinkable, though not apparently mentionable, that the Polish workers and Warsaw's dissident intellectuals might have had some part in the victory. I can even remember visiting one or two of the latter, such as Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, who operated in a mainly secular and partly Jewish milieu, and who thought of Cardinal Glemp of Warsaw as one of their main enemies. But I'll have to postpone this reflection to another time, when we are less servile and less saturated with the notion of deliverance from on high.

What strikes one now is the similarity between the predicament of the Vatican and the predicament of the Kremlin about 45 years ago. Between the death of Stalin and the end of Khrushchev, the crucial question was: How much heresy and revisionism and autonomy can be permitted, without endangering the entire ideology of the regime? We know now how that issue was decided in the material world. Is the supposedly spiritual world immune from similar strains?

Without, it seems, quite noticing what they are saying, the partisans of the late pope have been praising him for his many apologies. He apologized to the Jewish people for the Vatican's glacial coldness during the Final Solution, and for historic filiations between the church and anti-Semitism. He apologized to the Eastern Orthodox Christians, and to the Muslims, for the appalling damage done to civilization by papal advocacy of the Crusades, and by forced conversion and massacre in the Balkans during the church's open alliance with fascism during World War II. He apologized to the world of science and reason by admitting that Galileo should not have been condemned by the Inquisition. These are not small climb-downs, and they do not apply just to the past. They are and were admissions that the Roman Catholic Church has been responsible for the retarding of human development on a colossal scale.

However, "be not afraid." The God-given right of the papacy to make and enforce absolute judgments is not at all at stake. Popes may have been wrong on everything, but they were right in general. By the time the church apologizes for saying that condoms are worse than AIDS, or admits that it was complicit at best in the mass murder in Rwanda, another few generations will have died out. This is almost exactly the sort of stuff with which Communists and their fellow travelers once had to content themselves. There had indeed been "spots on Stalin's sun," as one hack so prettily phrased it. But the leading role of the party was still a sure thing.

Sensing, perhaps, that so many admissions and confessions might sow doubt and unease, Pope John Paul threw himself into the sort of reinforcement that unifies and heartens the flock, or the base. The special sign of this was the mass production of saints and the removal of all obstacles to near-instant canonization and beatification. This is especially handy for beefing up the faith in outlying regions, where a local hero is considered good for morale. Alas for those who value consistency, some of those canonized were at odds with the larger purpose served by the famous apologies. Cardinal Stepinac of Croatia, for example, had been a clerical ally of the Nazi puppet regime of Ante Pavelic, and had known full well of the vile treatment of Orthodox Christians and Jews under this dispensation. Jose Maria Escriva de Balaguer, the creepy founder of Opus Dei, was celebrated for his closeness to Gen. Franco. To make saints of such riffraff is the most obvious form of opportunism.

Seeking to cloud a difficult situation with even more of the fragrance of obscurantism, the pope also resorted to an almost wholesale appropriation of the cult of the Virgin. He openly announced that the bullet that hit him was prevented from taking his life not because of the skill of his physicians, but because its trajectory had been guided by Our Lady. She let the assassin fire and hit, in other words, and only then took action. (This reminds me of Bertrand Russell's comment on the practice of placing covers on the baths in convents so as to avoid offending the sight of God. The creator can see through the roof of the convent, and down into the bathrooms in the basement, but is hopelessly baffled by a sheet of canvas.) Sites such as Fatima, which had been frowned upon by serious Catholics for some years, became objects of adoration and pilgrimage and hysteria. The veneration of the Virgin, and the endlessly repeated mantra of "Totus Tuus" ("Everything for Thee") seemed to many veteran believers to depose Jesus in favor of a Marian idolatry, and even to violate the commandment against graven images.

Finally, if the pope is to have so much credit for the liberation of Eastern Europe, he ought to accept his responsibility for the enslavement of the Middle East. He not only opposed the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, but the use of force to get him out of Kuwait in 1991. I have never read any deployment of Augustinian argument, in the latter case, that would not qualify it as a just war. Moreover, the pope made a visit to Damascus not long ago, and sat quietly outside the Grand Mosque while the Assad regime greeted him as one who understood that Muslims and Catholics had a common enemy—in the Jews who had killed Christ. (That he may already have been senescent at this point is not an answer: It is a problem, though, for those who believe that he was Christ's vicar on earth.)

Unbelievers are more merciful and understanding than believers, as well as more rational. We do not believe that the pope will face judgment or eternal punishment for the millions who will die needlessly from AIDS, or for his excusing and sheltering of those who committed the unpardonable sin of raping and torturing children, or for the countless people whose sex lives have been ruined by guilt and shame and who are taught to respect the body only when it is a lifeless cadaver like that of Terri Schiavo. For us, this day is only the interment of an elderly and querulous celibate, who came too late and who stayed too long, and whose primitive ideology did not permit him the true self-criticism that could have saved him, and others less innocent, from so many errors and crimes.

Friday, April 8

Festival for Art on Film, April 9 Akron, Ohio

Festival for Art on Film: "Organized by Wigged Productions, the Festival for Art on Film was created to foster new ways of thinking about the relationship between the arts and moving image media, and to encourage critical analysis of media productions. The festival showcases documentaries on art and artists and media works that interpret dance, music, poetry and visual art.

The festival is hosted by the College of Fine and Applied Arts at The University of Akron. Selections from the Festival for Art on Film are also showcased at the Subtropics Experimental Music and Sound Art Festival in Miami, Florida.
festival goals

* To promote art on film and documentaries on art through public screenings;
* To increase public awareness and appreciation of art;
* To promote art, artists and cultural understanding;
* To create a forum for contacts, dialogue and exchange of experience. "